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Home » CEO Insider » Why The Layer Below The CEO Stays Thin, Even When Leadership Development Is Well Funded
CEO Insider

Why The Layer Below The CEO Stays Thin, Even When Leadership Development Is Well Funded

Stuart Andrews

Most organisations fund leadership development, and few have a strong bench behind the CEO when a successor is needed. The cause is structural, and no training budget reaches it. 

Eighty-six percent of organisations run formal leadership development programmes. Eleven percent say they have a strong leadership bench. Both figures come from the same DDI research, published in 2021, and the distance between them is what this article is about.

A CHRO once asked me to design a leadership pipeline, and the reason was easy to state. Senior roles kept being filled from outside. That is the moment this article is about. A seat opens, or the CEO starts thinking about their own exit, and the board looks one layer down. It finds capable function heads, and none of them has done the job in question.

The usual diagnosis is that the programmes were not good enough, or that there were not enough of them. Sometimes that is true. My view is different. The thin layer below the CEO is a product of how the company is built, and training cannot repair a structure it is delivered around. This article sets out what the evidence says, why the layer stays thin, what that costs, and what to do about it, with a table that pairs each insight with a practical step.

What the evidence shows 

The research on boards describes the same moment. In Spencer Stuart’s 2024 survey of 797 directors, 45 percent were concerned they would not have even one internal candidate ready when a CEO transition arrived, and that rose to 66 percent when the question was about having two or more. Thirty-seven percent said they had already delayed a CEO transition because they lacked an internal candidate.

DDI’s figures have improved only a little. Confidence in the bench fell from 18 percent in 2011 to 11 percent in 2020, and by 2024 DDI’s Global Leadership Forecast put it at 20 percent of HR professionals. That still leaves four in five without confidence in their pipeline.

Development does matter. In the same 2021 data, no organisation without development had a strong bench, and 28 percent of those with high-quality development did. But that leaves most of the well-developed organisations short, and more of the same spending does not explain why. Something else limits what the spending can produce.

Six things that decide whether the layer below becomes a bench 

The first is where the decisions sit. The decisions that make someone ready to run a company are the cross-functional ones: which function gets the funding, which bet is dropped, who moves out of a senior role. In most companies the structure sends those to the CEO, because the CEO’s seat is the only place where the functions meet. Function heads run functions, and they run them well, which is how they got the job. Ram Charan made the point in Harvard Business Review in 2005: functional leaders learn to lead functions, not whole companies, and moving candidates quickly through different roles does not fix that when they never stay long enough to live with the consequences of their calls. Joseph Bower of Harvard Business School, writing in 2007, argued that a talented manager should be given a whole business to run early, ideally by about 30, so that they become good insiders.

A CEO once told me their team was not strategic. The cause was unclear decision rights, and capability was not the issue. When the CEO separated the decisions they had to own from the ones they could hand on, the team took decisions inside the new boundaries and the CEO’s involvement in routine decisions dropped.

The second is where practice happens. Most development is delivered alongside the job. People attend a programme, come back, and find the job unchanged: the same meetings, the same routing of decisions, the same questions going upward. Michael Beer, Magnus Finnström and Derek Schrader wrote in Harvard Business Review in 2016 that people soon revert to old ways of working, and that fixes in organisational design and managerial processes have to come first, because the context a leader returns to decides whether the learning holds. That is why I build development into the meetings leaders already hold. In one team, the regular leadership meeting gained a slot where one leader brought a live decision and the group coached it. Over time those leaders used the same questions without me in the room, and it showed in how they delegated. In another, I coached the CEO to model the behaviours in the executive meeting first, and the next layer then adopted them. After 24 months the behaviour was part of how the team ran and had outlasted the programme.

The third is who sees the layer below perform. A bench is a claim until the people who choose the next CEO have watched the candidates do something difficult. The evidence on this is mixed. In Spencer Stuart’s 2024 survey, 66 percent of directors said their board had direct exposure to possible internal successors in the previous 12 months. In Russell Reynolds’ 2025 board research, only 52 percent of directors said they were acquainted with executives beyond the CEO, and half did not have confidence in an internal candidate even on a temporary basis. Meeting a candidate is not the same as watching one handle something hard. Where the CEO is the main witness, the board is relying on one person’s opinion of their own team. In one case I saw, succession planning started well before the expected transition. Because there was time, candidates had stretch roles and the board had seen them perform, so when the transition came the choice was clear and the business stayed steady.

The fourth is timing. Boards tend to start succession late and treat it as an event, and they lack a view of who is ready. In Spencer Stuart’s 2025 survey of nominating and governance chairs, 69 percent reported spending ten hours or less a year on succession-related activities. Russell Reynolds asked directors at organisations with a formal succession plan how far ahead it looked. Only 8 percent said five years, while half said one to three. Readiness in a leader builds over years of live decisions. Succession that gets ten hours or less a year, with a horizon of one to three years, is a snapshot.

The fifth is who is choosing. A CEO is usually the person with the most information about the candidates and the most at stake in the answer, and in most companies nothing counterbalances that. Åsa Björnberg and Claudio Feser of McKinsey described the effect in 2015. A CEO with what they called the “more of me” bias looks for, or tries to develop, a copy of themselves. An incumbent with the sabotage bias, consciously or not, promotes a candidate who may not be ready and who therefore seems likely to prolong the current CEO’s reign. Neither is a character flaw. Both are what you would expect when one person is asked to groom and judge their own replacement. Spencer Stuart’s 2025 survey of nominating and governance chairs found that 51 percent of boards use external advisers to assess internal candidates, which is one way to add a second opinion.

The sixth is what gets measured. A programme can count attendance, completion and satisfaction. None of those tells a board who is ready for a particular role. In Spencer Stuart’s 2024 survey, 49 percent of directors had reviewed development plans for possible internal successors in the previous 12 months, and only 27 percent had reviewed formal analysis or assessments of them. The same survey found no strong consensus on how boards develop their internal candidates: half reported executive coaching, 46 percent promotion into new roles and 32 percent targeted rotations. A company can have a full calendar of development and still be unable to say, for any critical role, who would take it, when they would be ready and what they have yet to prove.

What the thin layer costs 

A thin layer takes away the board’s choice. Bower analysed 1,800 successions and found that company performance was significantly better when insiders succeeded to the CEO job, and he observed that too many companies without succession plans turn to outsiders when the time comes. A 2025 report from The Conference Board, Egon Zehnder, ESGAUGE and Semler Brossy shows external appointments in the S&P 500 nearly doubling in a year, from 18 percent to 33 percent, the highest in eight years.

Not every outside appointment reflects a thin bench. The report’s authors read the rise as boards prioritising strategic renewal and fresh perspectives, and an outside CEO can be the right call. My point is about choice. A board that goes outside with a ready internal candidate on the table has made a decision. A board that goes outside because there is nobody inside has not.

Being forced into that position is expensive. Charan wrote in 2005, citing Dan Ciampa’s work, that two out of five new CEOs fail in their first 18 months, and he warned that outside CEOs in particular often bring in their own teams, can cause the company to lose focus and are especially costly to be rid of. The 2005 figure is old, but the mechanism is easy to see. An outside CEO who rebuilds the team is replacing the very layer the company never built.

What changes it 

None of this argues for cutting the development budget. It argues for changing what the budget is attached to. In my work the practical steps fall into five.

Start with a short diagnosis. A CHRO phoned me because the pipeline of future leaders was thinning ahead of a planned leadership change. We started with a short diagnosis of where leaders were being developed and where they were stuck, and the CHRO and CEO agreed who would own the next step. The CHRO and CEO shared a view of the pipeline and had a named owner for the next step.

Hand on decisions first. In a founder-led business that had outgrown its leadership layer, nearly every significant decision still ran through the CEO. I agreed with the CEO which categories of decision to hand on, then coached the next layer to take them. Within 12 months the CEO had 75 percent fewer escalations, and the team was making every operational decision without waiting. The development followed the decision rights. It did not come before them.

Be selective about readiness. Nobody needs a readiness view of the whole organisation. In my pipeline work I build one for the roles that matter most, the top 12 roles in one case, and within 12 to 24 months executive leadership roles were filled by prepared internal successors instead of emergency hires.

Plan for the emergency. The common failure is the absence of an emergency plan. Russell Reynolds found that around a quarter of directors did not know what their emergency CEO plan would be. I help boards put one in place, with named interim options and communications ready, which reduces the risk of a rushed decision.

Plan the handover. When a CEO was preparing to leave and the board wanted a smooth handover, I worked with the CEO, the board chair and the successor on what needed to transfer: relationships, knowledge and priorities. The handover completed smoothly, and the board kept continuity of relationships and priorities.

The insights and the practical step for each 

The table pairs each insight with what you will see in the company, the step it points to, and the evidence that the step has worked.

A 90-day start 

  • Days 1 to 30. List the last 20 significant decisions and who made them. Name the roles whose vacancy would hurt the company most.
  • Days 31 to 60. Choose three categories of decision to hand on, with an owner and boundaries for each. Agree stretch assignments for the candidates for the critical roles.
  • Days 61 to 90. Take the readiness view to the board. Agree the emergency plan. Put the quarterly pipeline review in the calendar.

The CHRO who started this conversation wanted a bench the CEO could see. We identified the roles that mattered most, assessed who could realistically be ready, and designed stretch assignments for them. A development budget can raise what people are capable of. Whether any of them becomes a successor depends on whether the company has given them a decision to own, a place to practise it and people watching while they do. The layer below a CEO is made by the work it is given.

Written by Spencer Stuart.
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Stuart Andrews
Stuart Andrews is an executive leadership coach and member of the Forbes Coaches Council, and author of The Leadership Shift. He works with CEOs and...

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