While mass protests are unlikely to lead to the collapse of the Russian government in the two-month outlook, political instability risks will rise substantially following presidential elections in March 2012.
Parliamentary elections took place on 4 December 2011. The ruling United Russia party, that won a constitutional majority of 66% in the 2007 election, now has only a plurality of 49.3%. This represents the largest drop in public support for United Russia since its founding in 2001. Vladimir Putin, prime minister and former president (2000-2008), is universally associated with United Russia, and this election is widely seen as a referendum on Putin’s leadership. Presidential elections will be held on 4 March 2012, and Putin is currently the only credible competitor in that race.
Mass protests took place across Russia in the aftermath of parliamentary elections which were widely perceived as fraudulent. On 6 December, a loose alliance of opposition groups organised a demonstration in central Moscow, which attracted about 8,000 participants. Then on 10 December, some 30,000-35,000 Moscow residents took part in a demonstration across the river from the Kremlin. On the same day, demonstrations were held in almost all of Russia’s cities with a population of over a million residents; the smallest of these had at least 1,000 participants. Taken together, these are the largest anti-government protests that Russia has seen since the early 1990s both in terms of the number of participants and the geographical scope of the protests.
Opposition fragmentation, together with a more tolerant government stance, lowers the risk that demonstrations will trigger government change.
The mass demonstrations held in Moscow and across the country over the past ten days have been the largest since the 1990s. However, a number of indicators tell us that we are not at this stage seeing the equivalent of the “Arab Spring”. First, at the protests on 10 December, the dominant demand was for the government to investigate electoral fraud. Few calls were made by speakers for Putin’s resignation; indeed, nationalists calling for “revolution” were booed by the crowd. Second, the opposition is fragmented and spans a broad political spectrum from ultra-nationalists to radical Communists. As a consequence, the protests suffer from a lack of a coherent political message. None of the opposition groups, which include the liberal party Yabloko, have parliamentary representation. Nor, broadly speaking, do they benefit from strong support by the ‘systemic’ or loyal parliamentary opposition (the Communists, LDPR and Fair Russia). These parties are largely satisfied with the gains they have made in the elections. Moreover, at this time it appears unlikely that the non-systemic opposition groups will be able to unite behind a common candidate in the March presidential elections, as the deadline for registration is 15 December.
Third, while the authorities initially appeared determined to suppress the demonstrations at all costs (moving 52,000 interior troops and police personnel along with armoured vehicles into Moscow), on 10 December their tactics changed. The police presence was minimal and state media began covering the protests, having previously minimised or misrepresented them. We assess that these two developments are geared at containing the protest movement, rather than recognising its legitimacy: the authorities remain resistant to open criticism of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin or his party, United Russia. This became clear from the firing of the editor of the influential business publication Kommersant-Vlast on 13 December, for publishing an issue featuring Putin with the tagline “Victory of the United Ballot-Stuffers”. Finally, the government is well aware that Western powers are unlikely to openly support government change in Russia as they have in the Middle East, despite statements from the US and EU criticising the recent election results. The West would certainly like to see a scaling-back of Russia’s defence spending plans as well as an improved environment for foreign investment and less state dominance in natural resources, but would avoid direct intervention in favour of regime change.
Protests are likely to taper off in January 2012, particularly if demands such as the dismissal of the Election Commission head are met; however, violent suppression would increase the risk of a public backlash sufficient to raise the possibility of new elections.
At this time, a further protest is planned for 24 December, with permission from the Moscow authorities for 50,000 people to attend. Protests are likely to diminish in magnitude by mid-January, especially if the security services maintain a neutral stance and President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin make at least token gestures in response to the protesters’ demands. These demands include the dismissal of Central Election Commission (CEC) Head Vladimir Churov, new parliamentary elections, registration of banned opposition parties, and freeing political prisoners. As a partial measure, on 12 December Medvedev ordered an investigation of vote falsification. It is likely that a number of governors will be dismissed in the provinces where falsifications were particularly rampant; this is already taking place at the local level. The dismissal of Churov would be a particularly positive development in terms of reducing civil unrest risks, however at this time the CEC is adamantly denying this possibility. The demand for a re-run of elections will meet with even stronger resistance by the Kremlin, and would only be granted as a last resort in the face of overwhelming protests.
There are several indicators to watch for, which would increase the likelihood of protests on a sufficient scale to achieve this goal. Violent suppression, for instance, would increase the risk of a public backlash; however, the Russian government is cognizant of this and is unlikely to use force to suppress the protests. The unification of the systemic opposition with the protesters, a stream of high-profile defections from the regime to the opposition, or from the police and military rank-and-file, would also be signs of accelerating momentum. A severe economic downturn, prompted by the Eurozone crisis and falling commodities prices, would increase popular support for the protest movement by detracting from Putin’s legitimacy, particularly given that much of Putin’s popularity stems from the economic prosperity of Russia in the last decade.
Under the still-unlikely scenario that the opposition would be successful in calling for new elections, several things are likely to happen. A new centre-right liberal party is likely to be formed, which will pick up the votes of the disgruntled urban electorate. The threshold for entering Parliament is likely to be lowered, allowing nominal representation for parties such as Yabloko which heretofore has been unable to clear the 7% limit. United Russia’s share of the vote would likely go down to 35-40% from its current 49.3%. However, these changes to the political landscape are unlikely to translate into significant policy shifts away from the current agenda of modernisation and gradual liberalisation. Strategic sectors are unlikely to become more open to foreign investment, unless Putin is also prevented from becoming president.
Risks to the stability of the government are considerably higher in the aftermath of the presidential election in March 2012.
Considering that it is unlikely that the Russian government will hold new parliamentary elections, this raises the question of challenges to Putin’s candidacy in the presidential elections. On balance, given the current pool of contenders for the presidential office, Vladimir Putin is likely to win in the second round even in a completely fair election. Importantly, the deadline for the first stage in the process of registering as a contender in the presidential race will expire on 15 December. The opposition is therefore likely to prepare for protests against a Putin presidency, and these protests are likely to be better-organised, larger and more virulent than the current demonstrations.
However, the movement will face the difficulty of a lack of a credible alternative to Putin. Mass public protests leading to a violent change in government might be possible if the opposition manages to field a popular common candidate and their candidate succeeds in substantially narrowing Putin’s lead in the polls. A close election would allow the opposition groups to cry foul and would translate into a massive intensification of the public protests. As noted above, the opposition’s ability to field a credible common candidate is questionable at this time. The recently imprisoned anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who espouses nationalist views, has some appeal among disenfranchised voters, but is relatively little-known outside of the online activist community.
There are early signs that political insiders could attempt to channel anti-Putin sentiment into a challenge to his presidency, though their chances of success are moderate at best.
On 12 December, Mikhail Prokhorov, Russia’s third-richest man and the owner of the ONEXIM Group, announced that he would contest the presidency. Prokhorov was snubbed by the Putin-Medvedev alliance earlier in the autumn. He was first invited to lead a newly-created centre-right party, then forced out as the party’s leader when it became clear that he intended the party to become a genuine political force and not another of the Kremlin’s political projects. However, oligarchs are not well-regarded by the Russian electorate, and his credibility has been tarnished by his previous association with the Kremlin. Some in the opposition have labelled him a pro-Putin candidate. He is most likely operating with the approval of the Kremlin, though if not, expropriation risks to his assets would rise considerably.
Aleksei Kudrin, Russia’s long-serving finance minister (2000-2011), who was dismissed in September after a public spat with President Medvedev, has likewise indicated that he may be interested in leading an opposition party on the centre-right. Although given Kudrin’s long friendship and personal loyalty to Putin it is unlikely that he would unite the non-systemic opposition, he is still likely to become instrumental in the formation of liberal party representing the Russian middle class. After the current wave of protests, the Russian government has become aware of the need to open the political space for such a force, a view recently confirmed by the influential head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov.
(Writing by Alisa Lockwood, Head of Eurasia Forecasting, Exclusive Analysis is a specialist intelligence company that forecasts commercially relevant political and violent risks worldwide.)
