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Signals of decreasing F-35 quantities and looking cost-effective substitutes for the US forces

By Guest contributors for CEOWORLD Magazine Updated:October 21, 2009

First cut , QDR 1997: 126 aircraft deleted The numbers to be procured by the US forces have decreased since 1996 with over 500 units. In 1996 a total quantity of 2978 was mentioned, 2.036 for the US Air Force, and 942 for USMC/USN.

In 1997 a total quantity of 2852 was mentioned. The May 1997 QDR reduced the procurement to 1.763 for the US Air Force and changed the number into 1.089 for the US Marine Corps and US Navy. The May 1997 QDR reduced procurement to 480 for the Navy and noted that up to 230 of the Navy’s 480 JSFs could be replaced by F/A-18E/Fs,
depending on the progress of the JSF program and the price of its Navy variant compared to the F/A-18E/F. The May 1997 QDR planned a procurement of 609 JSFs for the US Marine Corps.

From 1999 until 2001 this total US Forces quantity of 2.852 has been used in The Netherlands (and may other countries) in the preparation of the decision to participate in the SDD phase of the JSF.

Conclusion: Since the Program Start in 1996 273 US Air Force are deleted.

Second cut, QDR 2002: 409 aircraft deleted

In April 2002 the Department of the Navy was reviewing a proposal to cut JSF production by 409 aircraft, 259 jets from the US Marine Corps F-35B buy to some 350; and 150 from the Navy F-35C purchase to a total of 330 F-35Cs. The Department of the Navy was concerned that it could not afford the number of tactical aircraft it planned to purchase and reduced the number of backup aircraft needed.

Conclusion: Since the Program Start in 1996 some 262 US Navy/US Marine Corps F-35s are deleted. Since the start of the F-35 SDD in 2002 some 409 US Navy/US Marine Corps F- 35s are deleted.

Attempt to new cuts, ACC 2004 and QDR 2006

In 2004 the Air Combat Command announces a reduction from 1.763 to 1.550 F-35s for the US Air Force. This is confirmed by the next US GAO report about the JSF. However, some partner countries are not content with the decreasing numbers and are questioning the US about it. From then, officially the number of 1.763 F-35s is maintained again in public documents.

But in 2005, prior to the US Quadrennial Defense 2006 review, again a much lower requirement is mentioned. Only 2.180 F-35’s would be required. But again, this number doesn’t get an official status. However it shows the inside analysis within the Pentagon about the future requirements. The Los Angeles Times writes July 27, 2005 “some inside the Defense Department say that the deepest cuts could come from the JSF program. According to one source, the Pentagon could cut the Air Force allotment of th planes by half.”.

To avoid tensions with the international partners, the MOU-PSFD (Annex A) as signed by the nine JSF partner countries between November 2006 and February 2007 speaks again about the official number of 2.443 F-35’s to be procured by US Forces between Fiscal Year 2007 and Fiscal Year 2027.

Conclusion: Several times lower numbers are mentioned, but for commercial and public relation reasons these lower number get no official status.

Shift of 515 aircraft to FY2028-2035 after partners signed MOU-PSFD 2007

The USA showed to be an unreliable business partner in the beginning of 2007. While the ink of the MOU-PSFD of November 2006 isn’t dry yet (JSF partner countries Denmark and Norway signed in January/February 2007), the US proposes to extend the procurement period from FY2027 to FY2035. Only two months after this document had been signed by the JSF partner countries, the US changes the MOU-PSFD Appendix A and is moving 515 F-35 aircraft to a far and uncertain future, lowering their number of more expensive early birds, influencing the economy of scale of the production during the essential years 2015-2022.

Moving their US requirements to a far and uncertain future, Fiscal Year 2028 to Fiscal Year 2035 was a smart, political decision. They could maintain the same “2443” quantity and find a solution for the funding problems until 2022. It influences the economy of scale, makes the early buy of allied JSF partner countries more expensive, frustrating partliament members in these countries. The average unit pric increases by this move to the future.

Conclusion: The original mentioned requirement of 2.978 F-35’s for the US Forces, fundamental for the early decisions to participate in the Concept Development of the JSF in the 1996-1999 timeframe has been brought back to 2.443, including major shifts in time from early years to a far future. This has a major impact on the economy of scale of the Program.

Planned procurement until FY2013 decreased with 660 units

In the original planning of 2001 six Low Rate Initial Production series were planned, with a total of 465 aircraft, including the first three year of Full Rate Production. Until FY2013 the US would buy around 937 F35s.

However planning was changed after the delays in the SDD phase and only 5 years later the number of aircraft to be procured until FY2013 was decreased to 519. Since the quantity has been lowered year by year until only 273 units.

Conclusion: since 2001 over 660 units were deleted from the JSF production planning until FY2013. And budget used in one year will not return in a next year.

Continuous, recent, downsizing 2007-2009: 200 aircraft deleted

In the MOU-PSFD of February 2007 we can find a planned Low Rate Initial Production during FY2007 until FY2009 (LRIP-1-LRIP3) of 68 units. The LRIP-4 – LRIP-7 and first full rate production years show a production planning during FY2010 until FY2015 of 675 units for the US forces.

From FY2007-FY2015 the US would buy a number of 743 units out of a total planned production of 1.027 units (72% of the total production). The FY2009 budget, presented by Mr. Robert Gates in April 2009 shows a Low Rate Initial
Production during FY2007 until FY2009 (LRIP-1-LRIP3) of 28 units, 40 less than planned around two years before. The LRIP-4 – LRIP-7 and first full rate production years show an (unconfirmed) production planning during FY2010 until FY2015 of 513 units for the US forces.

When approved by Congress, the US would buy from FY2007-FY2015 a number of 541 units out of a total planned production of 790 units (68% of the total production).

Conclusion: the last 3 years over 200 units were deleted from the US procurement planning between FY2007 and FY2015.

More F/A-18 Super Hornet purchases means less F-35C budget

Based on the currently known numbers the total production of US Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18 Growlers will end in FY2011 with a total number of 546 aircraft. Since the start of the operations 13 aircraft are crashed of withdrawn, making a remaining number of 533 aircraft.

In April 2002 the Pentagon was planning a total US Navy purchase of 330 F-35Cs and limit the US Navy’s F/A-18E/F acquisition to 460 aircraft, making a total of 790 future US Navy Jet Fighters. With the delayed Initial Operational Capability date of 2015 and the growing US Navy “fighter gap” some 90 more F/A-18 Super Hornets were procured than originally planned: 546 in stead of 460.

On the other side, since the start of the Joint Strike Fighter program in 2001 a continuous move in numbers to future years can be seen, as shown in as shown in Table 51.5 . In 2001 a number of 61 F-35Cs was planned to procure from FY2005 until FY2009, this has been changed into zero F-35Cs. Also a total number of 199 F-35Cs was planned from FY2005 until FY2013, this has been changed into only 42 F-35Cs. Within the total future US Navy Jet Fighter requirement of 790 fighters and a total of about 530 F/A-18 Super Hornets, only a requirement for 260 F-35C’s will remain.

Conclusion: The requirement and the budget of the US Navy to buy the original planned number of 330 F-35C’s has become under pressure by additional Super Hornet buys.

Failing attempts to establish a consortium buy

Since 2007 there have been negotations about a certain Level Line Price for the F-35 between the USA and the international JSF partner countries. Lockheed Martin reported in April 2008 that it had entered into negotations with several countries, after some governments expressed concerns that the cost of early-production aircraft might be higher tan later aircraft.

Not only US congressional rules and a lack of interest amongst international partners have frustrated the negotations to achieve a price guarantee for the aircraft. In November 2008, during the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) meeting in Oslo it didn’t result in an agreement. And half a year later, during the JESB meeting it became clear that
the attempts would fail. This was confirmed by an Australin Defence official on September 22, 2009 in an interview with The Australian Financial Review.

Conclusion: Delay in testing, delay in early production, delay of political decisions in several countries, US congressional rules to get a Multi Year Buy before succesfull end of the Initial Test & Evaluation stage, the uncertainty about a real (fixed) price and the wish to keep “all options” open, also within the Pentagon, have played a role in the failed attempts to establish a consortium buy.

The JSF engine debate as a signal of lower quantities than predicted

It would be outside the focus of this report to discuss the alternate General Electric/Rolls Royce F136 engine of the F-35 Lightning II.

However in the ongoing discussion between Pentagon and US Congress and in all press publications about the F135 versus F136 engine debate one element is missing as a possible cause. Without any doubt, in the original planning of the development and production of the F-35 the second engine played an important role. Not only in the USA, but also in several countries a lot of money was spend in the development of the second engine. In 2000-2002, and also
later, several calculations suggested a 60%-40% ration between the numbers of Pratt & Whitney F135 and GE/RR F136 engines. Based on the suggested number of 5.000 – 6.000 F-35’s there would be a requirement for 3.000 – 3.600 P&W F135 engines and 2.000 – 2.400 GE/RR F136 engines.

In other words: for each engine there would be sufficient economy of scale. So, why cancel one of the engines. In the debate the threatening with a Veto by the Administration Obama is quite unusual. What may be the deepest reason? In my opinion, it is because behind the screens, many are knowing already that with much lower F-35 quantities to be manufactured it will be difficult to achieve sufficient economy of scale. With a total production of 2.500 F-35’s there would be a market of around 1.800 P&W F135 engines and 700 GE/RR F136 engines. This would have an upward effect on the costprice.

Conclusion: In my opinion the ongoing engine debate can be considered as a signal for much lower F-35s to be produced than predicted.

CSBA analysis August 2009 “F-35 may be flying into budget storm”

On August 12, 2009, the private Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, several of whose one-time experts are now serving in senior Obama administration jobs, released an analysis of the Fiscal Year 2010 budget, and cited the F-35 as just one example of programs ripe for review. Their advice: “Rather than buying both new long-range bombers and thousands of short-range F-35 fighters, DoD might consider whether the new bombers <..>
could represent a cost-effective substitute for some number of these new fighters. Adding, that the use of unmanned systems “could enable a radically different force structure that achieves the same level of effectiveness at a much lower cost”.

Conclusion: influencal advisors of the Obama administration suggest more cost-effective substitutes of the F-35 are available.

By Johan Boeder (The Netherlands) started publishing about aviation in 1977 as a freelance author and publicist working for several newspapers. Since 2007 he advices Members of Parliament in several European countries as an independent expert on the F-35 fighter program and business case.

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