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Reasons that will influence Joint Strike Fighter future procurement decisions- cause lower F-35
By Guest contributors for CEOWORLD Magazine Updated:October 21, 2009
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Lower (world wide) quantities mean further cost growth
Delay of F-35 system development, delay of low rate production and full rate production with several years, the uncertainties about a (fixed) price, a “level line price” or a “consortium buy price”, the uncertain delivery schedule and the political situation have caused delays in most of the JSF partner countries. Not only they delayed the decisions, also a lower number will be procured. In the international market no any fixed Foreign Military Sales order could be
materialised. This effects the economy of scale of the production facilities world wide.
Conclusion: the effects of the delay in international, decreasing the expected economy of scale, will cause a higher unit proce. These effects are not recalculated.
Deadly embracing between lower quantities and higher price
Considering the expected cost growth as a result of other factors, as shown in previous paragraphs, a negative spiralling effect may be expected of (1)higher price-makes-lower quantities, and (2) lower quantities is less economy of scale; and (3) less economy of scale makes higher prices; etcetera. This will give the additional effect of a deadly embracing between decreasing quantities and increasing unit prices and life cycle costs.
The effects as summarized in the previous paragraphs can be recalculated for the total procurement quantity until FY2034, as shown in Table:
Conclusion: further cost growth and other tactical fighter budget priorities will have an important influence at the total F-35 procurement. It is safe to predict that, given the budget, given the other budget priorities and estimated cost growth a quantity of only 1170 to 1590 F35s can be procured by the US forces until FY2034.
Fighter gap: alternatives found in short term
Within the US forces there is a need for alternatives to fill the fighter gaps in the US Air Force with rapidly aging F-15s and F16s and the US Navy with aging F/A-18 Hornets. Some upgrade programs (F-15Es, O/A-10 until 2028) wouldn’t have been proposed. Also additional F/A-18 Super Hornets buys in FY2008 until FY2011 wouldn’t have had any chance when the F-35C had been in time. Also development of other alternatives wouldn’t have had such a high priority when the F-35 had been fielded in time (some UCAV, OA-X).
Conclusion: the F35 delays lead to a need to fill the fighter gap with other available options.
Fighter gap will lead to closed squadrons
The US fiscal year FY2010 defense budget request would end production of the F-22A Raptor at 187 fighters and retire 250 of the oldest fighters. This would not produce sufficient new fighters to replace the legacy planes as they retire from service.
In April 2008, Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Air Force could have a requirement gap of over 800 fighters by 2024.
If the Super Hornet production is cut off and the F-35C will be delayed, the US Navy will have the need to populating the carrier air wing with 2 fighter squadrons as opposed to 4. Not yet considering the rapid aging of the legacy F/A-18 Hornets at the rate they US Navy and US Marine Corps are using them. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in April 2009 unveiled a potentially larger gap, citing a briefing to House Armed Services Committee staffers in which the Navy projected that its strike fighter shortfall could grow to 50 aircraft by FY 2010 and 243 by 2018 (129 Navy and 114 Marine Corps fighters).
In the near future many F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 squadrons have to be closed, because the needed replacement cannot be delivered in time. Squadrons cannot be closed for some years and restart again. It will be an irreversible process of leaking away of operational experience, maintenance knowledge, etcetera. Pilots and personell involved will find other
jobs.
Conclusion: Closed squadrons will be closed for ever. This will have an irreversible effect. Closed squadrons will never get F-35s.
Fighter gap and budget constraints will lead to smaller squadrons
Another factor is what Airforce Magazine wrote in April 2008: “To compensate, the Air Force has altered the traditional per-squadron aircraft numbers so as to increase the number of squadrons. It now considers the standard F-22 squadron to have 18 airplanes, not 24. Even so, the plan struggles to flesh out seven squadrons, and the smaller units have higher overhead costs with less flexibility and combat power.”
And like Thomas Ehrhardt, special assistant of the Chief of Staff ot the USAF in his latest CSBA Report “An Air Force Strategy fot the Long Haul” of September 2009 suggests: “540 combat coded F-35As, this would yield thirty squadrons” (of 18 F-35s). And in the footnote: “The specifics of the cut were based on AEF structure, with three eighteen-aircraft squadrons per AEF…. Note that because F-35A units will not have a primary air-to-air operational mission, they also do not require twenty-four-jet squadrons to conduct 24/7 operations, as would the F-22.”
Conclusion: Smaller squadrons will have less F-35s.
Growth of Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicles
The Pentagon is increasingly focussing on Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicles (UAV/UCAVs). A quote in an US Air Force bulletin of 13-aug-2009 shows this: “In April 2009, Secretary Gates cited unmanned aircraft systems as an increasing part of the Air Force arsenal, as he recommended that Congress halt production of the F-22 Raptor fighter
jet and devote more funding to unmanned systems.
The secretary compared the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the Reaper unmanned system, noting that the Reaper has a range of about 3,000 miles and can carry 1.5 tons of weapons — all unmanned and remotely — while the manned F-16 fighter has a range of about 500 miles. The ability to sneak in and operate for long periods of time without risking aviators is incredible, the general said. He referenced a recent mission in which a RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned system flew for 33 straight hours conducting reconnaissance operations for ground commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unmanned aircraft systems, he added, can take off from the Middle East, go to Iraq and Afghanistan, and conduct missions for both theaters.”
At the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International’s Unmanned Systems North America 2009 convention, which began 09-Aug-2009 and ended 13-Aug-2009 in Washington more than 5.000 people from 30 countries took part in the exhibition of robots and unmanned systems capabilities showing numerous UAV and UCAV solutions.
In Fiscal Year FY2009, the USAir Force has spent more money on unmanned aircraft systems and trained more operators than fighter jets and fighter pilots. Demand for unmanned systems by the U.S. military has increased more than 660 percent since 2004 and will double again between 2010 and 2015. This means a major shift of budgets and US
military employees from manned fighters to unmanned systems, especially for battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconaissance (ISR) missions.
In the next QDR we may find this back this opinion of Thomas Ehrhardt, special assistant of the Chief of Staff ot the USAF: “The same ill fit appears on the other end of the conflict spectrum, where the F-35s low-observable features, escalating cost, and nineteen million lines of computer code make it a great deal more expensive to buy, and more complicated to operate and sustain, than the Predator or Reaper UAVs, which are performing well beyond expectations and scoring the majority of high-value hits in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Conclusion: there is a major shift towards Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicles. This will bring down the numbers of F-35s to be purchased: other operational needs and budgets moved from F-35s to UCAVs.
Changing operationeel needs new OA-X (light attack/observation aircraft)
On 23-dec-2008 US Air Force Air Combat Command issued a document titled “OA-X Enabling Concept” to frame an operational construct for ACC’s fielding of light attack/observation aircraft, referred to as OA-X, in support of Combatant Commander’s close air support (CAS), armed reconnaissance, non traditional intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), show of force and peace enforcement.
The document confirms there is a need for alternative “lower cost air capabilities” ($2.2.1) and that continued reliance on A-10, F-16 and F-15E fleets is too expensive and will significantly reduce airframe lifespan. The assumption is made that “The USAF will continue to operate in a fiscally constrained environment” ($2.2.6).
The ACC is aware that a new OA-X will mean less F-35’s: “Funds for procurement of the OAX system could threaten funding for procurement of newer air-ground capable aircraft (e.g. F- 35)”.
The document concludes that the US Air Force’s operations in Afghanistan consists mainly of a continuous armed overwatch presence using high performance fighters. And that the US Air Force could save 300 millions of dollars each year in fuel and operation costs alone if it replaced one deployed squadron F-16s and half of a squadron of F15Es with smaller, lightattack aircraft that could essentially conduct the same mission. ($3.2 and $3.3).
The ACC concludes “we must be able to operate across the full range of military operations, but lacks a “right-tech” solution required in Irregular Warfare and lower-threat conditions across the spectrum of conflict. In accordance with DoD Directive 3000.07, 1-dec-2008, the USAF must recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare”. The report says that the “employment of high-performance fighters, originally designed for Main Combat
Operations in an integrated air defense environment (typically the F-35), is an expensive method of providing a constant level of support”.
The ACC advices the use of OA-X aircraft in low-threat environments ($4.5); the use by Partner Countries ($4.5.1 and $5.4.1) and US Air National Guard ($5.4.2; $9.3.1).
Conclusion: Because F35s are too high-tech, too expensive, too late, the US forces have defined the need for a more simple “complementary” aircraft. A new threat to the production quantities of the F-35, the deadly embracing of the “lower production numbers-higher price spiral” is continuing.
Changing operational needs: new 4.5 gen fighters
The US Air National Guard will be hit heavely by the delay of the F-35. The call to purchase additional fourth-generation fighters (new generation advanced F-16s) for the Air National Guard is growing, because the air sovereignty mission remains a critical component of America’s homeland defense posture. As one source writes: “Many at the Pentagon and in Congress seem prepared to gamble in the medium term that the F-35 will eventually help the
atrophying Air National Guard to sustain the air sovereignty mission, but an interim “bridge” is required to reach this stage. Extending the service life of the Air National Guard’s current fleet is possible, but expensive ($20 million) and would add just 1,500 hours. Instead, Congress should purchase additional fourth-generation fighters, which are relatively inexpensive, to bridge the coming gap in FY 2010.”
In 2007 Steven Kosiak and Barry Watts published a report “Fighter Modernization Plan, near term choices” [#51.96] with a clear analysis of several options:
Option 1: cancel all F-35s and procure 2443 Advanced F-16s and F/A-18 Super Hornets.
Option 2: cut the planned number of 1763 F-35A and replace them by Advanced F-16s.
Option 3: cancel the F-35C Carrier Variant and buy F/A-18 Super Hornets in stead
Option 4: execute both option 2 and option 3, Option 4 would give annual savings of US$ 800 – US$ 1.100 million.
Now Steven Kosiak is working in the White House with Peter Orszag in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on Defense Issues and will have a chance to test his analysis on the real budget. So it may be expected that his ideas will play a role in future (financial) planning of the US Forces.
Growing concerns about the US Homeland Air Sovereignty mission lead to growing pressure to purchase additional 4.5-generation fighters for the US Air National Guard as an interim bridge for the delayed F-35 and as an alternative for expensive life-extension programs.
Conclusion: there is a growing pressure to buy less expensive, less high-tech, non-stealth aircraft for other operational duties.
Operationeel need for more and new medium range capacity
Within the US forces is a need for medium range air platform to be fielded between now and 2034. In a CSBA report of Steven Kosiak (who now has a key function within the US Department of Defence of the Obama-administration), an analysis has been given about the need to procure a medium range air combat capacity.
Most plausible platform may be a variant of the US Navy’s UCAS-D. There is growing inbalance toward short range
tactical fighters. There are plenty of arguments to restore a sufficient medium range capacity within the US Air Force and US Navy.
Thomas Ehrhardt, special assistant of the Chief of Staff ot the USAF in his latest CSBA Report “An Air Force Strategy fot the Long Haul” of September 2009 describes the need for more medium range capacity in relationship to the development future basing options for the US Forces, changing balance of power in Asia and the need of availability of
(expensive) tanker aircraft. This will require a part of the budget of tactical fighters: “This would provide 540 combat-coded F-35As on the ramp, or thirty squadrons of F-35s by 2021 in time to allow the Air Force budget to absorb other program ramp-ups like New Generation Bomber.”
Conclusion: there is a growing need for long range and medium range strike aircraft within the US Forces, this will require a part of the budget of the F-35.
F-35 cost per flight hour more than doubled since 2002
In the US Government Accountability Office report 08-388, dated March 2008 it states, under reference to the SARs (= Selected Acquisition Report, the US DoD annual justification for major projects): “Recently DoD sharply increased its projection of JSF operating and support costs compared to previous estimates. The December 2006 SAR projected life-cycle operating and support costs for all three variants at $ 650.3 billion, almost double the $346.7 billion amount shown in the December 2005 SAR and similar estimates.
The operating cost per flying hour for the JSF CTOL is now estimated to be greater than current flying hour cost for the F-16, one of the legacy aircraft to be replaced. Officials explained that the amounts reported in 2005 and before were early estimates based on very little data, whereas the new estimate is of higher fidelity, informed by more information as JSF development progresses and more knowledge is obtained. Factors responsible for the increased cost estimate included a revised fielding and basing plan, changes in repair plans, revised costs for depot maintenance, increased fuel costs, increased fuel consumption, revised estimates of manpower and mission personnel, and a new estimate of the costs of the JSF’s autonomic logistics system. Overall, the cost of ownership represents a very large and continuing requirement for the life of fielded aircraft”.
By Johan Boeder (The Netherlands) started publishing about aviation in 1977 as a freelance author and publicist working for several newspapers. Since 2007 he advices Members of Parliament in several European countries as an independent expert on the F-35 fighter program and business case.
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